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THE CONVICTION OF ANDREA YATES: A NARRATIVE OF DENIAL
SHERRY F. COLB*
INTRODUCTION
Previously an anonymous married mother of five, Andrea Yates drowned
her children to death in June of 2001 and instantly became a household name.
The public desperately sought an explanation.  Everyone hoped for a reassuring
narrative about Andrea’s actions that would make sense out of the senseless and
thereby restore our faith that mothers do not kill their children, even in the face
of the reality that they do, and that Andrea had.
Two alternative accounts of the Yates tragedy immediately presented
themselves.  One was that Andrea1 was insane; the other, that she was evil.  If
Andrea was completely crazy, then the public could embrace the notion that be-
cause the mother in this case was out of her mind, it followed that, in some
sense, Andrea’s authentic self did not truly kill her own children.  Barring that
explanation, Andrea had to have been a monster of mythical proportions who
accordingly deserved harsh punishment.  Either way, the public could hold onto
its belief that a shockingly deviant force was at work, and people accordingly
would not have to alter any of their deeply held assumptions about motherhood
in response.  In the social realm, extreme deviance, by its very nature, affirms
rather than threatens the boundaries of the norm.
In “Who Is Andrea Yates?  A Short Story About Insanity,” Professor Debo-
rah W. Denno opens a startling and compelling window on the Yates prosecu-
tor’s distortion and manipulation of facts through its star expert witness, Park
Dietz.2  Though surprisingly unfamiliar with the nature of the mental illness
from which Andrea was apparently suffering (postpartum depression and psy-
chosis), as Denno relates, Dietz opined with confidence that Andrea was sane
and in control when she killed her offspring.  At least in part because of Dietz’s
testimony, a jury convicted Andrea of capital murder.3
As Professor Denno describes with clarity and precision, the Texas law of
insanity is quite narrow and unforgiving.4  To prevail, a person would have to
prove that a serious mental illness had so afflicted her that she was unable to
know that her act was “wrong,” an adjective that itself admits of no straightfor-
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1. I will refer to Andrea Yates primarily as “Andrea” as Deborah Denno does in her article,
Who Is Andrea Yates?  A Short Story About Insanity,  10 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 (2003).
2. Denno, supra note 1, at 17.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 16-7.
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ward definition in Texas.5  Such a standard, as I too have argued,6 left little space
for an acquittal.  Add to that the charismatic, if ill-informed, testimony of Park
Dietz, and Andrea may never have had a chance.
I found Denno’s presentation both insightful and persuasive.  Andrea’s
conviction may have been an over-determined phenomenon, an event, in other
words, for which it is difficult to identify one “but for” cause, without which the
jury might have returned a verdict of not guilty.  In this commentary, my objec-
tive is therefore modest.  I wish not to detract in any way from Professor
Denno’s outstanding article but merely to add one more to the list of arguably
sufficient causes for Andrea’s conviction.  My addition is the jury’s need for a
satisfying narrative.
AUDIENCE CHOICE OF NARRATIVE
To understand how an audience might select a narrative from a series of
possibilities, consider the ancient tale of the Wisdom of Solomon.7  In this story,
two “harlots” each give birth to a baby.8  One of the babies dies in the night, and
when morning comes, each of the women claims to be the mother of the living
infant.9  The mothers bring their case before the wise King Solomon of Israel.10
The King thus becomes the chosen finder of fact, the monarchical equivalent of
today’s jury.  Solomon has a solution to the women’s dilemma.  He asks for a
sword and says, “Divide the living child in two, and give half to the one, and
half to the other.”11  In response to this grotesque decree by the King, one of the
women (whom the text describes as “the woman whose the living child was”)
begs Solomon to spare the child, even if it will mean losing the infant to her ri-
val.12  The other woman says that she can live with the division of the child.13
Upon hearing each mother’s response, Solomon determines that the first
woman is the “real” mother and places the (whole, unharmed) baby in her cus-
tody.14
Audiences have long enjoyed this story, because it seems to confirm what
we already believed—that a true mother is willing to sacrifice her own happi-
ness for the survival of her child, and that she would never deliberately put her
baby in harm’s way.  A selfless love, in other words, is the failsafe litmus test of
motherhood.
5. Id. (discussing the ambiguity of the Texas insanity standard vis-à-vis the meaning of
“wrong” (illegal versus immoral by a community standard versus subjectively viewed as immoral)).
6. See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, Insane Fear: The Discriminatory Category of “Mentally Ill and Danger-
ous,” 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. AND CIV. CONFINEMENT 341 (1999).
7. 1 Kings 3:16-28.
8. Id. at 3:16-18.
9. Id. at 3:19-22.
10. Id. at 3:22.
11. Id. at 3:25.
12. Id. at 3:26.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 3:27.
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THE ALTERNATIVE STORY
Consider now an alternative reading of the Solomon story.15  Assume that it
was the biological mother of the baby who agreed to have her child split in two.
In an unexpected twist on the story of a jealous lover, this mother would sooner
see her baby dead than in the arms of another woman, saying, “Let it be neither
mine nor thine, but divide it.”16
On this reading, the woman who said, “O my lord, give her the living
child, and in no wise slay it,”17 may have understood that her bluff was called.
In grief for her own dead child, she had attempted to lay claim to another
woman’s baby.  Having no desire, however, to see a second infant die, the kid-
napper gave up her demand in exchange for the child’s life.
Between the two accounts of the Wisdom of Solomon, the strict textual
story is the more palatable.  One of the women is truly evil.  She first seeks to
kidnap another woman’s child and then agrees to have the King slaughter the
innocent baby, rather than see the real mother reclaim her offspring.  The other
woman, by contrast, is a good mother who does nothing wrong.  She pleads for
her baby but will give up the infant rather than subject her child to death.
The second story, by contrast, is alien and genuinely disturbing.  It is about
jealousy and pathology among mothers.  In this story, one woman attempts to
replace her dead child with another, and a second woman is ready to agree to
the death of her own offspring.  One cannot help but find the outcome—custody
to the kidnapper rather than the homicidally jealous biological mother—prudent
but nonetheless disconcerting.
FINDING A HAPPY ENDING IN THE YATES STORY
No matter how it is interpreted, the story of Andrea Yates is depressing
and tragic.  Unlike Solomon, we cannot escape the reality that Andrea was actu-
ally the mother of the five children she killed.  Indeed, it seemed to have been
precisely her experience of bearing these children that led inexorably to her
mental and emotional unraveling.  In other words, her status as their mother
may well have triggered her breakdown.
In the absence of a Hollywood-ready story, in which the true culprit is an
outsider onto which one can comfortably heap all condemnation, an audience—
the jury, in particular—had two imperfect narrative options from which to
choose in Andrea’s case.  Andrea was either “mad” or “bad.”  To classify her as
“mad,” moreover, could not simply mean that Andrea suffered from a mental
disorder, a fact that even Park Dietz did not dispute.18  It had to be more than
that.
15. I have, in different venues, proposed alternately that the Wisdom of Solomon might be a
story of denial, see Sherry F. Colb, Words that Deny, Devalue, and Punish: Judicial Responses to Fetus-
Envy?, 72 B.U. L. REV. 101, 112 (1992), or a story of awarding custody, see Sherry F. Colb, King Solo-
mon in the 21st Century, FindLaw (June 28, 2000) at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20000628.
html.  The story I present in this piece is more in keeping with the first of these two alternative
readings, although I expand upon its implications here more than I have in the past.
16. 1 Kings 3:16-28.
17. Id. at 3:26.
18. Denno, supra note 1, at 22.
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In our national mythology,19 a mother—as in the Solomon story—does not
do such things.  To violate that principle, a woman would have to be stark, rav-
ing mad and thus unrecognizable as a “mom.”  Because during her confession
Andrea sounded calm,20 because she was intelligent and spoke coherently, and
because she acted methodically rather than frenetically or hysterically, she could
not possibly have been “mad” in the sense that her audience needed her to have
been.  The prospect of a mother so apparently in control, yet incapable of re-
fraining from such an atrocity, would be too frightening to contemplate.
The alternative was that Andrea was “bad.”  This narrative, too, should
have been a stretch for the jury.  In the years before she killed her children, An-
drea was said to have been nurturing and giving, the sort of person who
thought of herself last and others first.21  She appeared to have truly loved her
family and to have comported with and aspired to conventional American ideals
of motherhood.22
Nonetheless, Park Dietz, expert for the prosecution, was part of a team that
persuaded the jurors to find Andrea responsible for her actions.  As Denno
shows, that was doubtless in part because Dietz was ready to speculate wildly
and attribute rationality to the actions of a woman who believed that Satan was
threatening her children’s eternal souls with damnation.23  Though Dietz
claimed to be on the side of justice and truth, Denno demonstrates just how ir-
relevant these ideals were to a man for whom the phrase “hired gun” could not
have been better suited.
ANOTHER SUFFICIENT CONDITION
Still, I want to suggest that there may have been one more card in the deck
stacked against Andrea: the jury’s need to believe that mothers who kill their
children are either obviously deranged or profoundly evil.  Because Andrea did
not fit the common stereotype of the screaming, hysterical, out-of-control luna-
tic, the alternatives were that Andrea was sick and yet, in many ways, very
much like other people; or that Andrea was evil.  The second alternative may
have seemed far less threatening a prospect than the first.
If Andrea was insane, as Denno suggests so effectively by mobilizing the
actual evidence, then what follows?  One conclusion that would be hard to es-
cape is that serious mental illness can be difficult to detect, particularly if the
sick person is in denial about her illness (as Andrea was).24  People like to believe
that they can “tell” who the mentally ill are.  If an insane woman can calmly exe-
cute a plan to drown her five children, however, and then immediately call the
19. Other countries have recognized the linked phenomena of postpartum mental illness and
infanticide and have accordingly provided categorically more lenient alternatives to incarceration for
the mothers in such cases.  See, e.g., Aliza Israel, Infanticide Risk Greatest in First Week, 128 THE REVIEW
(University of Delaware, March 15, 2002) (citing a Columbia Clinical Psychology Professor for the
proposition that “America is one of the only countries that put women guilty of infanticide in jail”).
20. Denno, supra note 1, at 36 .
21. See, e.g., Megan K. Stack, Killings Put Dark Side of Mom’s Life in Light, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 2001,
at A20.
22. Denno supra note 1, at 8.
23. Id. at 20.
24. Id. at 54.
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police, then there may be many very sick people who walk among us without
our even knowing it.  Who can guess what some of them might be capable of
doing?
Much more reassuring is the notion that a small number of people are evil
and do terrible things for which they must suffer condemnation and punish-
ment.  The result, that Andrea is one of these people—a deviant who can be
eliminated from society—is comparatively comforting.  Paradoxically, the no-
tion that a mother would not kill her own children—embraced by the traditional
Wisdom of Solomon story as well—is affirmed by the Yates jury if Andrea is
found to be evil rather than suffering from an illness that in milder forms afflicts
many mothers.  The latter calls the potential behavior of every mom into ques-
tion and would push us toward the more strange and disturbing version of the
Solomon tale.
NOT SO DIFFERENT
Shortly after Andrea’s arrest, I joined a group of panelists on a local cable
television show to examine the implications of Andrea’s actions.25  In one seg-
ment of the program, a woman called and said that she had never told anyone
her story before but that she had almost killed her own child many years ago.26
The host of the show, Lynn Doyle, tried to comfort the caller, telling her that
“almost” killing and actually killing are two very different things and that the
caller should feel proud of having sought help and having refrained from vio-
lence.27
The caller was grateful for the host’s comforting words but insisted that the
main difference between her and Andrea was luck.  This woman, who knew the
agony of severe postpartum depression, felt nothing but compassion and pity
for Andrea.28  The sense that something outside of herself and not all that rare
was operating on her and on Andrea was palpable and quite frightening.  If An-
drea was a victim instead of a perpetrator, then it might follow that for many
frightened and horrified families out there, it could have been them.
“WHODUNIT” AND “WHAT WAS DONE”
In an article published a couple of years ago,29 I analyzed the distinction
between two different types of criminal cases.  In one type, the “whodunit,” the
prosecution and defense agree that a crime was committed but disagree on
whether the defendant was correctly identified as having been involved in that
crime.  In the other, “what was done,” the prosecution and defense agree about
who the involved parties were but disagree on whether the defendant’s role was
culpable.




29. See Sherry F. Colb, “Whodunit” Versus “What Was Done”: When to Admit Character Evidence in
Criminal Cases, 79 N.C. L. REV. 939 (2001) [hereinafter Colb, Whodunit].
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An example of the “whodunit” scenario is a typical bank robbery prosecu-
tion.  No one denies that there was a crime.  The issue is only whether the de-
fendant was the one who committed it.  An example of the contrasting “what
was done” scenario is a rape prosecution in which the defendant claims that sex
was consensual.  No one disputes the fact of intercourse between the defendant
and the victim or the identity of the parties involved.  The question is whether
the defendant was acting without consent.
Research shows that juries tend to be more willing to convict in the “who-
dunit” than in the “what was done” scenario.30  Most of my article addresses the
evidentiary rules that should apply in each of the two types of cases, rules that
will remain outside the scope of the discussion here.  Relevant to this commen-
tary, however, is my hypothesis at the end of the article about why it tends to be
easier to obtain a conviction in a “whodunit” trial.31
The provisional explanation that I offer for this phenomenon is the jury’s
wish to have the happiest possible ending for a trial narrative.  If the prosecution
and the defense agree that a crime was committed, then the more satisfying out-
come is to find that the culprit has been caught and brought to justice rather
than that the defendant is innocent and the perpetrator still at large.  To the ex-
tent that the jury feels empowered to “make up the ending,” it might therefore
be inclined to find the available defendant guilty.
In the “what was done” case, however, there is a dispute about whether
any crime was committed at all.  Though a conviction is satisfying when a crime
has undoubtedly taken place, an even happier story is one in which no crime has
occurred at all and no one needs to be punished.  In such cases, I suggest, a jury
might therefore feel inclined toward acquittal.32
ANDREA’S CASE
How does my “whodunit”/”what was done” dichotomy help explain the
Andrea Yates verdict?  It would seem at first glance that because the prosecution
and the defense disagreed on the question of whether a crime had been com-
mitted at all, the case presents a “what was done” scenario, and the jury should
have been inclined to acquit.  Yet here I suggest just the opposite.
The reason that this and other insanity cases merit a distinct analysis, how-
ever, is that they do not feel the same to jurors as a typical “what was done”
scenario.  If a jury finds that an alleged victim consented to sex with a defen-
dant, for example, then it finds that there was no victimization of the complain-
ing witness and that the defendant was accordingly truly innocent of any
wrongdoing or harm.
Here, by contrast, Andrea killed her five children, and thus no one could
claim that there was no killing or victimization.  Her four sons and one daughter
were necessarily victims.  In an insanity case, even though the disagreement
between prosecution and defense concerns the defendant’s culpability rather
30. See David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1324 (1996-1997).
31. See Colb, Whodunit, supra note 29, at 989-992.
32. Id. at 990.
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than her identity, the structure of a verdict nonetheless resembles that in a
“whodunit” case: there are unavoidably victims and just as surely harms that
will go unpunished if the defendant is judged insane.
In keeping with this hypothesis, the informal conversations I had with
people who sympathized with Andrea and would probably have brought back
an acquittal, revealed a possible alternative culprit: Andrea’s husband, Rusty.
Several people asked me, for example, whether Rusty might be prosecuted for
homicide, either for impregnating a woman who doctors had warned should
never become pregnant again, or for failing to do more to prevent the tragedy
that occurred.  Thus, even those who were unable to fit Andrea into the role of
culprit still needed a guilty party to satisfy the narrative and focused the search
for a culprit on Rusty.
The lesson here is that when five children wind up dead, people want to
blame someone if a narrative of blame is remotely plausible.  They accordingly
attempt to transform a “what was done” narrative about one criminal defendant
into a “whodunit” scenario about assessing blame between a husband and a
wife—a transformation that is unavailable to jurors when only one person is on
trial.
As a defendant using the insanity defense, even absent the Dietz testimony,
Andrea may therefore have triggered the jurors’ inclination to convict.  Andrea’s
story, moreover, presented an additional reason for people to seek a narrative of
blame.  Beyond the desire to hold someone—rather than no one—accountable,
there was the apparent resemblance that Andrea bore to so many other moms.
That is, prior to killing her children, Andrea was not the obviously deranged,
homicidal maniac that one could easily pick out of a crowd.  If Andrea could be
brought to commit such a heinous deed by something other than an evil char-
acter, then so could other mothers, particularly those who are burdened with
caring for children at home with little besides their children’s needs to engage
their minds.
Rather than accept such a possibility and thus shatter a benevolent view of
motherhood in general and stay-at-home motherhood in particular, one could
instead deem Andrea “responsible.”  This would declare her a deviant soul
whose behavior had no larger implications, apart from the need to punish her
and thus deter other similarly evil people.
It may well have been this need on the part of the jury—to deny the reality
of postpartum depression and psychosis in a person who appeared sufficiently
similar to others to cause alarm—that Park Dietz satisfied through his expert
testimony.  Rather than being one of six victims on the day she drowned her
children, Andrea was labeled a perpetrator.
Dietz’s explanation made it easier to believe that an evil monster could
seem just like everyone else than that a sickness could look so much like nor-
malcy.  Bad people, moreover, make choices and, with the right set of incentives,
can be motivated to make the right ones in the future.  Mad ones might make
wrong choices regardless of incentives.  Order is restored, if we accept Dietz’s
version; order, in a sense, is impossible if we do not.
